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THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [CONFERENCE preferences and endowments, but also uncertainty, spatial separation, private information, limited communication, and limited commitment. This is illustrated by the subsections of Section II: the first subsection emphasises theoretical models with uncertainty and their usefulness in studying the agrarian, strip system of medieval English villages; the second and third subsections emphasise theoretical models with spatial separation and their usefulness in thinking about emergence of medieval currency and bills of exchange, respectively; and the fourth subsection emphasises theoretical models with the frictions of private information and limited communication and their usefulness in thinking about the tokens of some of the simpler economies studied by anthropologists. It is not surprising perhaps that observations in these example matches are drawn from historical or anthropological material. For, one can go beyond the cataloging of actual economies and ask whether our class of theoretical models is on the right track, whether the existing class of theoretical models fits the data reasonably well. To do this it seems natural, in the absence of controlled experiments, to study actual economies which are relatively simple and which have prominent elements that resemble the key elements of stylised theoretical models. The economies described by historians and anthropologists seem to have these features. (It was the search for a relatively simple contemporary economy with key elements that underlay my visit to the Thai villages.) Still, this fitting exercise is fraught with some peril, at least for the researcher, for it might seem that the theory can only be tested fruitfully on the battleground of actual economies that some would find uninteresting. If that were the case, then surely the theory is uninteresting, if not irrelevant, or so it might be argued. The counter to this argument is that both simpler actual economies and stylised theoretical models can be viewed as on a par with one another. Both can suggest associations and patterns that can help us to think about the reality of apparently more complicated economies. Again, the distinction between real and imaginary economies becomes blurred. Section III of this paper continues this line of argument and tries to make the case that general equilibrium models are a way to trace out the logic of economywide phenomena. For example, it is sometimes argued that private information and incentive problems must be the keys to understanding the dispersed land patterns of the English strip system, as described by historians. But with a stylised general equilibrium model on hand one can trace out as well the logical implications of private information for other phenomena. These implications can be confronted against what might have been thought to be seemingly unrelated observations, also provided by historians. Again, one is 'fitting' theories to observations. Alternatively, the cross-phenomena implications can guide further data collection, so that theory and empirical work are complementary. And finally, a not unrelated point made by McCloskey (personal correspondence) and others, is that theoretical models must be especially good or 'creative' when used to study economies for which there are great gaps in observations, gaps which may never be filled. In such cases a theoretical model provides the web which ties together seemingly unrelated I988]
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AS ECONOMIES 5 observations, though web is never seen. Again, theoretical and actual economies are complements.
Section IV continues further and argues with Lucas (I980) that general equilibrium models can be thought of as laboratories in which a researcher can conduct experiments. That is, one can try to find variations in actual environments and look at variations in actual outcomes. Alternatively, one can try out different environments in theoretical models and look at variations in outcomes there. Both ways can help us to understand reality and can aid in policy making. Section IV gives an example of this in arguing that general equilibrium models can be used to help with the design of optimal banking and intermediation arrangements. This section is also motivated by some historical observations, asking whether observed arrangements could be efficient for an environment invented by an economic theorist.
I. THE METHODS OF APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
General equilibrium models are usually specified at the level of the primitives of Debreu (I 959), for example. That is, one makes up an economy by specifying the set of households i, i = I, 2, ..., n; linear commodity space L; consumption set X' in space L for each household j; preferences represented by utility function uj on set XX for each household j; endowment wJ in space L for each householdj; firms k = I, 2, ..., m; and production set Yk in space L for each firm k. Here, moreover, household k will be said to have access to production technology Yk so that references to firms as entities apart from households is suppressed. Then, given an Arrow-Debreu environment, the applied general equilibrium theorist tries to make a prediction about the allocations and institutions which will emerge, that is, to form a mapping from the primitives to outcomes. There are several ways to do so, and none is without controversy. First, one can suppose that outcomes necessarily will be Pareto optimal for the specified environment. One attraction of this premise is that one can often deliver Pareto optimal allocations as solutions to a class of well-defined programming problems, problems of maximising weighted sums of utilities of the households subject to constraints implied by endowments and technology. The hypothesis that allocations are those achieved in competitive markets often serves to sharpen the predictions of the model, tightening the mapping from environments to outcomes. An alternative hypothesis to be coupled with Pareto optimality is the idea that allocations must be in the core. That is, an allocation xy*,yj*) j = I, 2, ..., n, is in the core if it is feasible (satisfies the competitive equilibrium condition (iii) above) and if there does not exist any subset of households C with allocation , yH, i e C, with the property that the allocation 9, yS is feasible for C, that is, gi c, y -eY' and += 0, iEC iEC EC and allocation 9,y' improves upon the *-allocation for C, that is, u'(gi) > ui(x'*) for all is C with a strict inequality for at least one i s C.
Again none of these ways of tightening the mapping from environments to outcomes is without controversy. But suffice it to note here that some premise is needed, since the set of feasible allocations is seldom restrictive. ' Indeed it might be argued that one can always find a theoretical model which fits the observations, and so the theory is not strained or tested. In fact, there is some truth to this argument, something which will be discussed again in Section V.i below. Here though the argument can be turned on its head. Guided by the theory, one might ask whether the landholdings of a typical medieval English village could have been such as to support the optimal consumption comovement implication if households ate the produce from their own strips. In fact, this is possible exactly under some conditions, if utility functions display constant relative risk aversion, and if all the uncertainty is associated with land types, for example. Further, the idea may hold good an approximation for a wider class of utility functions, though thoughts about the spatial nature of some shocks and limits on land division imposed by the technology of the plough lead one to some doubts.
Of course the reality of the medieval village does not conform well with all dimensions of the model described above, and some omissions may be serious. There was more than one consumption good in the medieval village (the list of crops includes oats, wheat, barley and rye), and this leads to some interesting issues concerning crop diversification. There may have been nontrivial storage possibilities, and this leads to issues concerning the substitutability of storage for cross household insurance and issues concerning various orders of magnitude, of the productivity of seed and of the depreciation on storage, for example. Crops were not given as endowments but were produced from labour and capital, leading to issues of leisure sharing and the joint distribution of income with oxen and land holdings. And shocks such as illness and disability have yet to be incorporated. It should be pointed out that the. theory often can accommodate these features. In fact, solutions to modified programmes often leave the consumption comovement implication intact. But these extended models and their implications deserve closer consideration.
Finally, it must be noted that one falls woefully short even in the extended class of models with uncertainty of an explanation of why English villagers seem to have preferred ex ante division of land, though the Thai villagers I described earlier seem to prefer the expost redistribution scheme of their temple. A discussion of this issue at this point would take us too far astray, into models IO THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [CONFERENCE with private information as a key element. But what I want to emphasise is that in reading about the English strip system or in thinking about the Thai temple we are aided by the theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty. We have found a class of theoretical models which can be used as a base to analyse these economies further.
II.2. Spatially Separated Markets and Medieval Currency
Various theoretical models begin with the idea that spatial separation is an important friction. Its importance in reality seems evident from a reading of economic history of medieval Europe. Briefly, the decline in economic activity and trade from the 5th to the ioth centuries was progressive, associated with waves of 'barbarian' invaders, Moslem attacks, Viking invasions, and so on. Of course the match between the theory of currency with spatially separated markets and the historical observations is suggestive at best. There are many theoretical and empirical questions on the definition of money, on the use of coins, and on the location and time patterns of markets which remain to be explored. But at least one does have a solid general equilibrium starting point for further work, a starting point which is amenable to modifications as observations dictate. In fact, I hope to illustrate this interplay in the next subsection.
II.3. Spatially Separated Markets and Bills of Exchange
In reading further about the financial instruments which emerged during the Commercial Revolution one discovers debt contracts are among the earliest i988] However, the circulation of bills was spotty, often accompanied by efforts at control or elimination. The model of currency with spatially separated agents described above can be modified to yield standard debt contracts, bills of exchange, and bills which circulate. In particular, bills emerge if one dispenses with the construct that traders meet at most once, say by breaking the highway at two points and bending the piece-around to form a circle. The resulting economy then is essentially equivalent to one in which agents type a and b, and their counterparts a' and b', are paired periodically, as in Table I In some respects the Kula was not unique. Raymond Firth (I939) reports similar internal arrangements on the island of Tikopia in I938. In particular, there seems to have been three spheres of exchange in Tikopia. In the first, various food items were exchanged against small objects and services. In the second, sinnet and bark-cloth items were exchanged against tools and specialists' skills. The third sphere of exchange involved bonito hooks, tumeric cylinders and canoes. Various of these objects passed among participants in ceremonial and 'forced' exchanges. For example, participants in funeral and marriage ceremonies were expected to give to one another specific items in one of the three spheres. Indeed, entire crops could be planted in anticipation of a forthcoming ceremony. Related, according to Firth, the objects and services in the three spheres could not be expressed in terms of one another since normally they were 'never brought to the bar of exchange together.' Related observations are reported by Baric (I964) and by Armstrong for Rossel island, where two types of shells and up to 36 subcategories of shells were required in various transfers. Again these were not normally exchanged against one another.
What sense can be made of these observations theoretically? Or, to narrow the focus considerably, can general equilibrium models give rise to a role for portable tokens, for some kind of decentralised communication-accounting system? The answer to this question seems to be in the affirmative if spatial separation and private information are brought in as key elements.
Specifically, imagine that agents type a and a' in the economy of Here the objective function (2) is a weighted sum of the expected utilities of the four agents of the model over the two periods of their lifetimes, equation (4) is the incentive constraint at date 2 which ensures that agent a will tell the truth about his endowment realisation at date 2 no matter what endowment was announced in the past, and equation (5) One example here will suffice to make this point, an example which brings us back to uncertainty and the English strip system. The premise to be evaluated is that private information gives the rationale for the dispersed lands of the strip system, that is, for ex ante division of land rather than ex post division of crops.
Indeed, this idea has a long history in the social sciences, though formalised only recently in the context of the literature on principal-agent problems. Essentially, by making individual households bear the consequences of their own actions and decisions, specifically eating their own crops, each household will be more inclined to work harder and to worry more about making good decisions. The key idea which formalises this intuition is that there is uncertainty about crop yields and that labour effort is not inferable ex post from observed output. Otherwise, a full information solution could be implemented by tightly specified labour assignments and full enforcement of the social contract. Then the pattern of landholdings would not matter.
An important piece of indirect evidence is consistent with the moral hazard I988]
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premise, ironically by its elimination. Specifically, the strips of the lord of the manor were farmed for him by the villagers, and so, if there was some scope for shirking, it should be evident there. In fact, villagers laboured on the lord's strips under highly specified, shock contingent assignments, with duties specified in meticulous detail, and more to the point, there was a group of officials on the strips, as in the meadows and woods, presumably to ensure performance. The hayward, woodward, reeve, and bailiff were officials of the lord who, among other duties, oversaw the ploughing, planting, weeding, harvesting, and transporting of the lord's grain. On a first pass one might suppose that a full information allocation of labour was effected on the lord's land but only at some not inconsequential cost, the cost of monitoring. But were there other means by which the lord might have obtained grain, and might these have been less costly? In fact, the local church seems to have obtained grain by fixed tithes, roughly I o % of each household's crop. Presumably, the lord might have done the same. In fact, there are references in the historical, descriptive literature to the lord receiving fixed percentage transfers in addition to that produced from his own lands. Thus one is faced with several possibilities about which theory has something to say, at least up to unobserved parameters. That is, one can write down a programming problem for the determination of transfers from agents to the lord, specifying probability distributions of agricultural outputs as functions of labour and capital inputs, specifying the degrees of risk aversion among the households, and specifying the costs of direct monitoring. The solution to this private information programme will then optimally weigh the disincentive effects of sharecropping, as households do not bear the full consequences of their effort, against the direct cost of monitoring on the lord's land. Coexistence of systems is a possibility, unconfirmed at the moment.
If the solution displays at least some sharecropping, then it seems it may also display properties inconsistent with reported observations. Specifically, formal models of sharecropping in the face of private information do not lead one to predict fixed percentage transfers as with the tithes. Further, if there is any common component to the shocks determining each household's crop, or any group of households who experience a common component, then one would predict cross household output comparisons, that is, cross-household tie-ins. In fact, the strip system, with virtually identical pieces of land allocated over various households, would seem to make shirking difficult (arguing for sharecropping rather than direct monitoring). Further, one would predict the intertemporal tie-ins mentioned earlier and insurance-borrowing agreements with the lord. These are the logical if somewhat unanticipated implications of the private information premise.
Actually, general equilibrium theory will be concerned with transfers among villagers themselves, not just with transfers to and from the lord. And if there is incomplete ex ante diversification of shocks by land dispersion, or idiosyncratic shocks to labour productivity reflecting illness or disability, then private information theory predicts nontrivial transfers of consumption ex post despite the strip system and predicts also nontrivial transfers of labour during the crop year. The nontrivial consumption transfers argue again for intertemporal tie-ins Observations on financial structures in medieval Europe provide motivation for me, at least, for some experiments that have yet to be performed adequately. The idea of taking the observations from history is that one naturally suspends disbelief and drops preconceptions about contemporary structures.
I. Exchange at the large international fairs of Champagne was supported by something close to a Walrasian pure credit system, or so it might seem. Each of these fairs was associated with a fixed calendar, the first few days for the introduction goods; the next for transactions in cloth, leathergoods, and drugs and spices, in that order; and the last at the end for settlement. Apparently, potential sellers received credit on the books of local bankers for goods not yet sold, credit transferred to the first sellers relatively early on in the fair sequence. In the end, accounts were to balance, and it seems from various reports that relatively few transactions were closed with the transfer of specie. Numerous historians emphasise that most if not all sellers brought little specie to these fairs. by assignment on bank accounts. Further, this practice seems to have been facilitated by the fact that each banker had an account with every other banker, so that withdrawal of coins was not necessary to pay a claim outside one's own bank. It is known that accounts across bankers were reconciled and settled from time to time. Finally, one of DeRoover's ledgers shows I I,ooo accounts, and he estimates the population of Bruges at the time at not more than 45,ooo. His conclusion: every merchant, broker, innkeeper, and draper had bank accounts, and probably also realtors, furriers, and goldsmiths. A tentative conclusion might be that, as with the fairs of Champagne, a banking, book-transfer system facilitated routine and more or less systematic payments. 3. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the banks of Barcelona and Bruges also engaged extensively in intermediary-investment activities, financing relatively long term and occasionally risky commercial undertakings. The account books studied by DeRoover reveal many small overdraft loans, and, more to the point, a few relatively large overdrafts which seem to have absorbed most of the banks' resources. Apparently, the latter were not temporary accounts; rather they were investment loans in which the banker entered into a partnership with the borrower, furnishing him permanently with working capital. The risk of loans in Bruges and elsewhere is explicitly acknowledged by the requirement of collateral or by the assignment of tax revenue in the case of loans to municipal authorities. Often, as in Barcelona, moneychangers were required to post an extraordinary bond before they could accept deposits. Further, municipal authorities occasionally attempted to control the portfolios of banks, as in Venice in I274, prohibiting bankers from trade in iron, copper, and tin and from holding more than two thirds of their investment in the public debt.
4. Still, banks failed frequently. In Bruges in I 309 the number of moneychangers fell from I9 to I 3. And according to one Venetian senator, of the I03 bankers that had existed at one time or another in Venice, 96 came to a bad end. Further, securities were often inadequate to cover losses. One Senior Costello was beheaded in front of his bank in Barcelona in I 360. DeRoover states, moreover, that banks were subject to runs on false rumours, imminence of war, news that a commercial venture had gone awry, or failure of a merchant in debt to the bank. Apparently, these failures and panics caused severe disruptions in the more mundane payments mechanism.
In the face of all this acknowledged risk one might guess that the liabilities of a bank might make a sharp distinction between depositors using the bank as a convenient means of payment and depositors using the bank as an investment-intermediary device. Unfortunately, evidence for any such separation of the means-of-payment role of banks from the investment-mutual fund role is far from overwhelming, with most deposits apparently payable on demand. In fact, the researcher begins to entertain doubts about the feasibility of separation, that is, about the distinction between these two roles. 
V. SOME FINAL COMMENTS ON METHOD AND PHILOSOPHY
In this final section I shall comment on some concerns of fundamental importance. Some of them have to do with the interaction between methods and philosophy. I shall try to separate the two.
V. i. Identification
At some level general equilibrium theory is vacuous. For example, for pure exchange economies it is known that one can generate any aggregate excess demand function by a suitable specification of endowments and preferences. Related, unobserved shocks to preferences with arbitrary probability distributions can generate arbitrary patterns of cross household consumptions. So, if some version of an enlarged model always fits, to what extent does general equilibrium theory have content?
As indicated initially, general equilibrium models can be regarded as a catalogue for actual economies, and so it is a virtue that there is always something in the catalogue which is close to the actual economy at hand. Still, there may be more than one close economy in the catalogue. That brings me to the view that we should try to catalogue or fit by choosing from relatively simple economies. Further, it seems plausible to me that impediments to trade, such as spatial separation and private information, are important determinants in reality, and so simple theoretical economies with these elements have a special appeal. Finally, impediments to trade can sometimes be checked against reality, whereas unobserved preference shocks cannot.
V.2. Decentralisation and Competitive Markets
The competitive markets hypothesis has been viewed primarily as a postulate to help make the mapping from environments to outcomes more precise. It has also been used as a device for simplification and tractability, bringing in I988]
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methods about which we know a great deal. In the end though it should be emphasised that market structure should be endogenous to the class of general equilibrium models at hand. That is, the theory should explain why markets sometimes exist and sometimes do not, so that economic organisation falls out in the solution to the mechanism design problem. Put crudely, one can accept the implications of a solution to some social optimum problem without embracing a decentralised, competitive version of the same economy.
V.3. Optimality and Social Activism
Pareto optimality has been recommended as the 'standard' technique to deliver the mapping from environments to outcomes, and this is troublesome. Specifically, in attempting to explain reality with the notion that allocations are optimal for some stylised model of reality, one appears close to the philosophy of Candide, that whatever happens we live in (or study) the best of all possible worlds. This philosophy is repugnant to those who believe that the world could be improved if only one were to understand it better. Yet the method of optimality seems to undercut any normative role for social scientists, since, as noted, observed institutions and outcomes are postulated to be optimal. Actually, the criticism at a superficial level is not as severe as it might seem. The 'optimality' models can deliver activist institutions in the sense that 
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